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Our society is sustained by wide-ranging cooperation. If individuals are sensitive to 25 
others‟ gains and losses as well as the amount of labor, they can ensure future beneficial 26 
cooperative interaction. However, it is still an open question whether nonhuman 27 
primates are sensitive to others‟ labor. We asked this question in tufted capuchin 28 
monkeys in an experimental food-sharing situation by comparing conditions with labor 29 
by two participants equalized (Equal labor condition) or unequalized (Unequal labor 30 
condition). The operator monkey pulled the drawer of one of two food containers placed 31 
between two monkeys, each containing a food for him/herself and another for the 32 
recipient monkey. The recipient received either high- or low-value food depending on 33 
the operator‟s choice, whereas the operator obtained the same food regardless of his/her 34 
choice. In Unequal labor condition, the operator first had to pull the handle of the board 35 
to which the containers were glued, and then pull the drawer of one of the containers, 36 
while the recipient received food with no labor. In Equal labor condition, the recipient 37 
had to pull the handle of the board so that the operator could operate a container. Results 38 
showed that operators chose the high-value food container for recipients more often 39 
than when the recipient was absent only in Equal labor condition. This suggests that 40 
capuchin monkeys are sensitive to others‟ labor and actively give food to a partner who 41 










Human social organization depends on cooperation with others (Boyd and 50 
Richerson 2005). Cooperation yields greater benefits than those that can be achieved by 51 
individual effort alone. Human cooperation appears to be maintained in part by 52 
prosocial orientations and a concern about inequity. 53 
Cooperation is in fact widespread in nonhumans (see Dugatkin 1997). In 54 
particular, several species of nonhuman primates have been demonstrated to show 55 
elaborate cooperative behaviors in the laboratory [e.g., chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes): 56 
Crawford 1937; Hirata and Fuwa 2007; Melis et al. 2006ab, capuchin monkeys (Cebus 57 
apella): Brosnan et al. 2006; de Waal and Berger 2000; Hattori et al. 2005, cotton-top 58 
tamarins (Saguinus oedipus): Cronin et al. 2005, 2008]. This may suggest that 59 
human-like cooperation has traceable evolutionary roots.  60 
Individuals are able to ensure future beneficial cooperative interaction, on the 61 
ground that they are not only sensitive to gains and losses but also able to compare their 62 
own effort and reward with others‟, that is, they have inequity aversion (IA). IA 63 
probably evolved over a series of simpler, intermediate steps in nonhuman primates. In 64 
Brosnan and de Waal (2003), brown capuchin monkeys apparently eschewed imbalance 65 
of reward and effort between participants in token exchanges with a human 66 
experimenter. The monkeys willingly exchanged tokens for a piece of cucumber at first, 67 
but they started to refuse the exchange or to accept the food after witnessing their 68 
partner receiving better food (a grape) for the same token. Such refusals increased when 69 
the partner received a grape without exchanging the token. Brosnan et al. (2005) and 70 
Brosnan et al. (2010b) replicated these results in chimpanzees (but see Bräuer et al. 71 
2009), although they did not appear to respond to the discrepancy between their own 72 
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effort and others‟.  73 
In this regard, however, several researchers have suggested that simpler 74 
cognitive mechanisms might explain the results of these studies (see Bräuer et al. 2006; 75 
Dubreuil et al. 2006; Henrich 2004; Silberberg et al. 2009; Roma et al. 2006; Wynne 76 
2004). For example, Roma et al. (2006) argued that the apparent aversion to inequity 77 
shown by Brosnan & de Waal (2003) might be explained by frustration due to an 78 
individual‟s past experience with greater rewards (but see Brosnan & de Waal 2006). 79 
On the other hand, Dindo and de Waal (2007) reported that no IA effect occurred when 80 
they gave free rewards to the monkeys as Bräuer et al. (2006), Dubreuil et al. (2006) 81 
and Roma et al. (2006) tasks, in which both the subject and the partner just determined 82 
whether they would accept a reward offered by the human experimenter without any 83 
labor. That is, they suggest that some labor is necessary to show IA. In addition, van 84 
Wolkenten et al. (2007) countered many of the alternative hypotheses, such as the greed 85 
and frustration accounts, by using a task requiring labor in both the subject and the 86 
partner in which IA was confirmed. Recently, however, Bräuer et al. (2009) failed to 87 
reproduce the findings of Brosnan et al. (2005) in great apes using the same procedure. 88 
Thus, the extent of IA in cooperative nonhuman primates remains open to debate. 89 
Therefore, first, it must be investigated whether cooperative nonhuman 90 
primates have essential components to have IA, that is, sensitivity to others‟ reward and 91 
their labor. Most of recent relevant studies with various primates have focused only on 92 
sensitivity to others‟ rewards, that is, other-regarding preferences, which underlie 93 
prosociality in humans (see de Waal and Suchak 2010). Several studies explicitly 94 
designed to look for prosocial preferences in chimpanzees found no evidence that they 95 
behave in ways that benefit their partners, even when it costs them nothing; that is, they 96 
5 
 
were indifferent to others‟ rewards (Silk et al. 2005; Jensen et al. 2006; Vonk et al. 2008, 97 
Yamamoto & Tanaka 2010). On the other hand, capuchin monkeys have showed 98 
sensitivity to others‟ rewards and other-regarding preferences in experimental 99 
food-sharing tasks (Lakshminarayanan & Santos 2008, Takimoto et al. 2010), a token 100 
exchange task (de Waal et al. 2008) and a bar-pull task (Brosnan et al. 2010a). Among 101 
other New World monkeys, common marmosets spontaneously provide food to 102 
nonreciprocating and genetically unrelated individuals (Burkart et al. 2007). Moreover, 103 
cottontop tamarins show sensitivity to others‟ rewards and a stronger reaction to 104 
inequity when they complete a task than when they do not (Neiworth et al. 2009; but see 105 
Cronin et al. 2008, 2009; Stevens 2010). It has been proposed that other-regarding 106 
preferences might be found in species that rely on cooperative strategies, such as 107 
cooperative breeding (Clutton-Brock 2002). Most recently, however, Brosnan et al. 108 
(2010b) showed that chimpanzees were more likely to refuse a high-value grape when 109 
another chimpanzee got a lower-value carrot than when the other chimpanzee also 110 
received a grape. In other words, chimpanzees avoided inequity which was 111 
advantageous for them, and showed other-regarding preference. Additionally, Melis et al. 112 
(in press) reported that chimpanzees helped their conspecifics obtain even food items, 113 
that is, the presence of food did not constrain chimpanzees‟ tendency to help others. 114 
Moreover, Hare & Kwetuenda (2010) reported that bonobos (Pongo pygmaeus) 115 
preferred to release a partner from an adjacent room and eat together instead of eating 116 
all the food alone. Together these studies suggest that sensitivity to others‟ rewards, in 117 
particular other-regarding preferences, is not unique to cooperative breeders but may be 118 
seen broadly among cooperating nonhuman primates. 119 
By comparison, there are very few studies on nonhuman primates‟ sensitivity 120 
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to others‟ labor. In de Waal & Berger (2000), pairs of capuchin monkeys were required 121 
to combine efforts to pull a tray with food. The capuchins more successfully cooperated 122 
when presented with a tray baited for both monkeys than when presented with a tray 123 
baited for only one. Moreover, significantly more pieces of food were shared after 124 
successful cooperation trials than after solo-effort trials. A greater portion of food 125 
transfers after cooperation were of a tolerant nature. However, an increase in proximity 126 
between the monkeys could have led to more food sharing as a byproduct, rather than as 127 
the intention of the operator. Moreover, it remains unclear whether experience of 128 
partners‟ cooperative labor leading to food would influence possessors‟ subsequent food 129 
sharing. Capuchin monkeys also showed sensitivity to their own effort and responded to 130 
inequity by modifying their effort to obtain food (van Walkenten et al. 2007). That is, 131 
capuchins increasingly refused a token or food when the effort required to obtain a 132 
reward increased. However, it was not clear if the subject monkeys were sensitive to 133 
their partners‟ effort because the partner monkey always received food without any 134 
effort. Thus, it is still an open question whether nonhuman primates are capable of 135 
recognizing others‟ effort and of comparing the cost/benefit relationship between self 136 
and others. 137 
In the present study, we investigated whether capuchin monkeys are sensitive 138 
to others‟ labor and its disparity between the participants (the operator and the recipient). 139 
We changed the amount of each participant‟s labor required to obtain food in an 140 
experimentally induced cooperative food-sharing situation. We expected situations that 141 
required labor in both participants to facilitate their sensitivity to others‟ reward and 142 
labor. The operators were able to give either high- or low-value food to recipients. The 143 
operators received the same high-value food regardless of their choices. Therefore, the 144 
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operators‟ choice of the high-value container for the recipient should indicate intentional 145 
giving of the high-value food and allow us to rule out giving as a by-product of the 146 
operator obtaining his/her own food. We also investigated whether experience of 147 
recipients‟ cooperative labor leading to food would influence operators‟ subsequent food 148 
choices by setting two Unequal labor conditions and conducting each Unequal labor 149 
condition before and after Equal labor condition. 150 
We manipulated the following 3 experimental parameters: the presence of the 151 
recipient (Faced or Alone condition), the recipient‟s social rank (Dominant or 152 
Subordinate recipient condition), the subjects‟ labor (Unequal labor 1, Equal labor or 153 
Unequal labor 2 condition). In Unequal labor 1 and 2 conditions, the operator first had 154 
to pull the handle of the board on which the two food containers were glued and then 155 
pull the drawer of one of the containers, while the recipient obtained food without any 156 
labor. In contrast, Equal labor condition was a cooperative food sharing situation in 157 
which the recipient first had to pull the handle of the board in order to reposition the 158 
containers so that the operator could select one by pulling the drawer. If operators are 159 
sensitive to others‟ labor and can compare it with their own, they should preferentially 160 
choose the high-value container in Equal labor condition, but not in Unequal labor 1 and 161 
2 conditions, of Faced, not Alone, conditions. In addition, once operators had 162 
experience of recipients having to work in order to receive rewards, the operators may 163 
become frustrated if the recipients obtain rewards without any labor (Unequal labor 2 164 
condition). If the sight of the previously helpful partner now free-riding is negative for 165 
the operator, he/she should choose the high-value container more frequently in Unequal 166 
labor 1 condition than Unequal labor 2 condition.  167 
Tufted capuchin monkeys are phyletically more distant from humans than 168 
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chimpanzees are, but they are suitable for such work in view of suggested IA (Brosnan 169 
and de Waal 2003; Brosnan et al. 2010a; Fletcher 2008; van Wolkenten et al. 2007) and 170 
robust prosociality (Brosnan et al. 2010a; de Waal et al. 2008; Lakchminarayanan and 171 
Santos 2008; Takimoto et al. 2010) of this species. Furthermore, capuchins are tolerant 172 
to the extent that they actively share high-value food especially with subordinates 173 
(Takimoto et al. 2010). This social background creates a baseline level of expectation of 174 
equity that makes individuals more likely to react to inequitable situations (Brosnan 175 
2006; de Waal 1996). Anderson (2007) suggested that more tolerant primates are more 176 
likely to show cooperation, and capuchin monkeys show some elaborate cooperative 177 
behaviors, linked to reciprocity and food sharing, both in the wild and in captivity (see 178 




Participants were six tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), housed together 183 
in a group of seven at the Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University. Heiji (male) 184 
and Zilla (female) were 15 years old, Kiki (female) and Theta (female) were 13 years 185 
old, Pigmon (male) was 11 years old and Zinnia (male) was 8 years old. All subjects 186 
except Zinnia, who was born to Heiji and Zilla in the laboratory, were born and raised 187 
in a social group at the Primate Research Institute, Kyoto University. The dominance 188 
hierarchy among these monkeys was very stable, confirmed through daily observations 189 
and occasional pairwise dominance tests using food competition. Heiji was the alpha 190 
male, while Theta was the most subordinate in the group. These two individuals served 191 
as recipients. In decreasing order of dominance, the others, who served as operators, 192 
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were ranked as follows: Pigmon, Zinnia, Zilla, and Kiki. 193 
 All monkeys had experienced a variety of laboratory tests on topics such as 194 
operant discrimination (Fujita 2004; Fujita and Giersch 2005), tool use (Fujita et al. 195 
2003; Fujita et al. in press), deception (Fujita et al. 2002), cooperation (Hattori et al. 196 
2005), social knowledge (Anderson et al. 2004; Anderson et al. 2005a,b; Anderson et al. 197 
2008; Anderson et al. 2010; Hattori et al. 2007; Hattori et al. 2010; Kuroshima et al. 198 
2002; Kuroshima et al. 2003; Kuroshima et al. 2008; Morimoto and Fujita in press), 199 
mirror-image stimulation (Paukner et al. 2004), and video-image stimulation (Anderson 200 
et al. 2009). The monkeys were not food deprived but received a portion of their daily 201 
rations during testing and the remainder in their home cage after testing each day. Kiki 202 
was pregnant and gave birth during the experiment, but she failed to care for the baby 203 




Figures 1a and 1b 208 
--------------------------------------- 209 
 Two experimental cages, 60 cm (W) x 45 cm (D) x 55 cm (H), made of 210 
transparent acrylic with a wire-mesh floor were placed facing each other across a 211 
wooden table, 80 cm (W) x 39 cm (D) x 74 cm (H) (Figure 1). An operator monkey was 212 
placed in one cage which had three round openings (3.5 cm in diameter) aligned 213 
horizontally in the front panel. These openings were 6 cm apart from each other and 214 
10.5 cm from the floor. A recipient monkey was placed in the other cage which had a 215 
front panel opening of 24 cm (W) x 3 cm (H). This opening was positioned centrally 216 
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and 8.5 cm from the floor. Each cage was set on a metallic pedestal of 65 cm (W) x 56 217 
cm (D) x 74cm (H). 218 
Two identical food containers, 9.5 cm (W) x 16 cm (D) x 10.5 cm (H), made of 219 
transparent acrylic were placed 12cm apart on a transparent acrylic board, 58cm(W)x 220 
30cm(D), on the wooden table between the two cages (Figure 1). The containers could 221 
slide along two metallic rails 58cm apart on a white plastic board, 58cm (W) x 41cm 222 
(D). The containers had a drawer, 9 cm (W) x 8 cm (D) x 3.5 cm (H) at the operator side, 223 
6 cm from the bottom. When pulled, the drawer, containing a food item, slid out to 224 
within reach of the operator monkey and this also dispensed food to the recipient by 225 
hitting a dropper board attached behind the drawer. The operator was allowed to pull 226 
only one drawer at a time. The recipient had no means of operating the drawer, and 227 
hence was a passive recipient of food.  228 
The precise placement of the containers and the handle of the board on which 229 
the containers were fixed varied as a function of the labor conditions. For Unequal labor 230 
1 and 2 conditions the containers were set out as shown in Figure 1a. The containers 231 
were placed out of reach of the operator, but the handle (W20cm×D0.5cm×H4cm) was 232 
either 10 cm or 14cm from the operator, determined by the operator‟s arm length. Thus 233 
the operator could pull the containers to within reach. For Equal labor condition the 234 
containers were set out as shown in Figure 1b. Now, the handle was within reach of the 235 
recipient (either 12 cm or 14 cm depending on the recipient). Additionally, the 236 
containers were moved 22 cm nearer to the operator‟s box, so that the operator could 237 
not pull on a drawer due to inadequate space.  238 
A transparent screen, 50 cm (W) x 28 cm (H), was placed against each cage to 239 
prevent the monkeys from handling the containers during inter-trial intervals and the 240 
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baiting process.  241 
All tests were recorded on two digital video cameras (Sony, DCR-TRV27), one 242 
located behind the recipient to record the operator‟s behavior and the other located 243 




Food preference test  248 
We conducted a food preference test to determine appropriate food rewards for 249 
all participants. Their preference between a piece of peanut and a few leaves of parsley 250 
was tested by a two-choice task. All of them showed a clear preference for the peanut 251 
over the parsley (12 choices out of the 12 trials). We thus decided to use peanut as a 252 
high-value food reward and parsley as a low-value reward in this experiment. 253 
 254 
Preliminary training 255 
The 4 operator monkeys had been trained to operate the food containers in the 256 
previous study (Takimoto et al. 2010). Therefore, they had learned that they were able 257 
to obtain food in the drawer of the container by pulling it within 30 seconds. They also 258 
had learned that the recipient monkey was able to collect food without any labor by the 259 
operator‟s pulling. Moreover, they had learned that they were able to obtain only their 260 
own food, not the food dropped on the recipient‟s side irrespective of the 261 
presence/absence of the recipient (see Takimoto et al. 2010 for details).  262 
In the preliminary training for operators before testing, all 4 operators were 263 
individually trained to obtain food by completing the sequence of pulling the handle of 264 
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the board and operating one of the two food containers. They were trained until they 265 
performed these operations within 30 sec at 80% level in five consecutive sessions (1 266 
session = 12 trials). Each operator participated in this training a session per day. This 267 
training required between 5 and 11 days.  268 
In the preliminary training for recipients before testing in Equal labor condition, 269 
both recipients were individually trained to obtain a chance to receive food by pulling 270 
the handle of the board to enable the operator‟s pulling the drawers, in the absence of 271 
the operator. The experimenter pulled the drawer of the food container in place of the 272 
operator, which prevented the recipient‟s experience of the interaction with the 273 
particular operator in the training from influencing the test results. The recipients were 274 
trained until they started the operation within 30 sec at 80% level in five consecutive 275 
sessions (1 session = 12 trials). Each recipient participated in this training a session per 276 
day. This training required 7 sessions.  277 
 278 
Test  279 
--------------------------------------- 280 
Figure 2 281 
--------------------------------------- 282 
The experimenter placed a transparent screen against the front panel of each 283 
cage. She then baited the two food containers. Following this, as soon as the operator 284 
looked toward the containers, the experimenter removed both screens simultaneously 285 
and the trial started. The operator chose one of two food containers and pulled the 286 
drawer of the container. The operator received the same high-value food whichever 287 
container he/she chose, whereas the recipient received either high- or low-value food 288 
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depending upon the operator‟s choice. The trial ended when the recipient picked up the 289 
food or in 10 sec after the operator‟s choice. During the inter-trial interval of 30 s, the 290 
experimenter removed any leftover food and set the containers up for the next trial.  291 
As described earlier, we varied three experimental parameters: (i) presence of 292 
the recipient, (ii) social rank of the recipient and (iii) labor of the two individuals (the 293 
operator and the recipient). Regarding the first parameter, in Alone condition 294 
(recipient-absent), food was delivered in front of the recipient‟s cage as in Faced 295 
condition (recipient-present), but it was removed by the experimenter after 10 s. For the 296 
second parameter, the recipient was either the dominant (Heiji) or the subordinate 297 
monkey (Theta). For the third parameter, in Unequal labor 1 and 2 conditions, the 298 
operator obtained food by completing the sequence of pulling the handle of the support 299 
board followed by opening the drawer; thus the operator had to complete 2 actions in 300 
order to obtain food, whereas the recipient received food without any labor. In Equal 301 
labor condition, first, the recipient pulled the handle of the support board in order to 302 
enable the operator to pull the drawer of a container and then the operator pulled one of 303 
the two containers. In other words, both operator and recipient contributed one action to 304 
obtain food for each. In Alone condition of Equal labor condition, however, the 305 
experimenter pulled the handle of the board in place of the recipient.  306 
Subjects were tested in the following sequence: first, Unequal labor 1, second, 307 
Equal labor, and third, Unequal labor 2 conditions in the ABA design. The reason why 308 
we set two Unequal labor conditions and conducted each Unequal condition before and 309 
after Equal condition was that we investigated whether the experience of others‟ labor 310 
leading to food in Equal labor condition would influence the operators‟ subsequent food 311 
choices. In all three conditions, the reward in the recipient side was either high- or 312 
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low-value food (see Figure 2). Left-right placement of food on the recipient‟s side was 313 
counterbalanced. 314 
 315 
Experimental design 316 
Each test session consisted of 10 trials. Each operator received 30 Faced 317 
(recipient-present) sessions and 30 Alone (recipient-absent) sessions. These two types 318 
of sessions were run alternatingly, one session per day. All operators started with the 319 
Alone condition. The recipients participated in two sessions every other day when 320 
Faced conditions were tested. The dominant and subordinate recipients were alternated 321 
every 10 sessions. The subjects‟ labor was changed after 20 and 40 sessions. All 322 
operators participated in this sequential order: Unequal labor 1, Equal labor and 323 
Unequal labor 2 condition.  324 
 325 
Analysis 326 
The experimenter recorded the operator‟s choices of container and any begging 327 
behaviors by the recipient on each trial. The records were confirmed from the 328 
videotapes later.  329 
First, we examined the average frequency of operator choices for the 330 
high-value container in three separate two-way repeated ANOVAs with the presence of 331 
the recipient and social rank of the recipient (dominant/subordinate) as factors for the 332 
subjects‟ labor conditions. Additionally, we examined the average difference in 333 
frequency of operator choices for the high-value container between the Faced and Alone 334 
conditions in a two-way repeated ANOVA with the subjects‟ labor and the social rank 335 
of the recipient as factors.  336 
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Second, we measured recipient begging behaviors for the high-value food 337 
container, including after operator choices for the low-value food container, as a 338 
possible indicator of frustration. Each average ratio of those behaviors was examined in 339 
a two-way repeated ANOVA with the social rank of the recipient and labor as factors.  340 
All analyses were conducted using SPSS version 17.0. The Bonferroni 341 




Figures 3a, 3b, 3c  346 
--------------------------------------- 347 
Figure 3 shows the average number of operator choices for the high-value food 348 
container in Unequal labor 1 (Figure 3a), Equal labor (Figure 3b) and Unequal labor 2 349 
conditions (Figure 3c). In Unequal 1 and 2 conditions, no main effect or interaction was 350 
significant. However, in Equal labor condition the main effect of presence of the 351 
recipient was significant [F1, 3=45.485, p=0.007]. No other main effect or interaction 352 
was significant. The difference in the average number of operator choices for the 353 
high-value food container between Faced and Alone conditions is presented in Figure 354 
S1 in Electronic Supplementary Material. This subtracted value is hereafter referred to 355 
as the operators‟ generosity score. The main effect of the labor was significant 356 
[F2,6=14.211, p=0.005]. Post-hoc comparisons revealed a significant difference only 357 
between Equal and Unequal labor 2 conditions [p=0.035]. No other main effects or 358 




Figure 4 361 
--------------------------------------- 362 
Figure 4 shows the average ratio of recipient begging behaviors for the 363 
high-value food container. The main effect of the labor was significant [F2,6=35.025, 364 
p=0.000]. Post-hoc comparisons revealed significant differences between Unequal labor 365 
1 and Equal labor conditions [p=0.030], and Equal and Unequal labor 2 conditions 366 
[p=0.028]. However, there was no difference between Unequal 1 and 2 conditions. No 367 
other main effect or interaction was significant. 368 
--------------------------------------- 369 
Figure 5 370 
--------------------------------------- 371 
Figure 5 shows the average ratio of recipient begging behaviors for the 372 
high-value food container after operators chose the low-value food container. This ratio 373 
is hereafter referred to as the recipients‟ frustration score. The main effect of the labor 374 
was significant [F2,6=14.541, p=0.005]. Post-hoc comparisons revealed a significant 375 
difference only between Equal and Unequal labor 2 conditions [p=0.010]. Moreover, 376 
although the main effect of recipient‟s social rank was not significant, there was a 377 
significant interaction between social rank of recipient and labor [F2,6=7.110, p=0.026]. 378 
This interaction means that, only in Unequal labor 1 condition, the dominant recipient 379 
more frequently begged for the high-value food container after operators chose the 380 
low-value food container than the subordinate recipient, though there was no difference 381 
between the ratios of both recipients‟ begging behaviors in the other labor conditions. 382 
Both the operators and the recipients ate the high-value food whenever it was 383 
given, whereas the recipients almost always refused to receive the low-value food 384 
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regardless of the subjects‟ labor conditions. The average ratio of recipient receiving the 385 
low-value food is presented in Figure S2 (a: Dominant recipient condition / b: 386 
Subordinate recipient condition) in Electronic Supplementary Material. 387 
 388 
Discussion 389 
In the present study, operator monkeys chose the high-value food container 390 
significantly more often when a conspecific recipient was present (Faced condition) 391 
than absent (Alone condition) only when the recipients helped them to operate the 392 
containers (Equal labor condition), irrespective of the social rank of the recipient. On 393 
the other hand, when operators alone had to work for food while recipients received 394 
food without any labor (Unequal labor 1 and 2 conditions), operators did not change 395 
their food sharing strategies as a function of the presence or social rank of the recipient. 396 
Additionally, they chose the high-value container for both recipients significantly more 397 
often in Equal labor condition than in Unequal labor 2 condition. These results clearly 398 
show that capuchin monkeys are sensitive to others‟ labor and may change how they 399 
distribute rewards depending upon others‟ contribution to the task. Moreover, operators 400 
were more likely to give their partner the low-value food in Unequal labor 2 compared 401 
to Unequal labor 1 condition, though not significantly so. Thus, the data imply a weak 402 
contrast effect based on whether the partner had to help previously. In other words, the 403 
operators may have been frustrated by witnessing recipients receiving food without any 404 
labor, after experiencing the same helpful partner.   405 
In de Waal & Berger (2000), food sharing could have been a byproduct of 406 
increased proximity between the monkeys, rather than an intention of the operator. This 407 
account fails to apply to our study, since the operator monkeys had to make a 408 
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dichotomous choice, and there was no increased proximity between operator and 409 
recipient. The operators in the present study made choices that were at chance level 410 
when the partner did not need to help, but actively tried to benefit their partner when 411 
he/she did help.  412 
Brosnan et al. (2010b) reported that the chimpanzees responded similarly when 413 
the partner obtained the same reward as they did for „free‟ versus when both individuals 414 
had to exchange to receive the reward. This finding is in accord with Fontenot et al. 415 
(2007) and van Wolkenten et al. (2007), which showed capuchins‟ failure to respond to 416 
differences in effort only. Such studies in which each individual‟s task was independent 417 
indicate that difference in effort alone is insufficient to evoke a response to inequity. On 418 
the other hand, Brosnan et al. (2006) investigated how capuchins would react to 419 
inequitable rewards by a joint task, as our study, which required the individuals to pull a 420 
bar together in order to receive food. They reported that capuchins‟ cooperation success 421 
depended not on the equity of the reward distribution, but on the equity of the partner‟s 422 
behavior. In other words, equitable capuchin dyads in which the individuals regularly 423 
alternated taking the higher-value reward in an unequal distribution were more than 424 
twice as successful as less-equitable dyads. Studies in which each individual‟s task was 425 
dependent, as Brosnan et al. (2006) and our study, suggest that perceived effort is more 426 
crucial in joint tasks for capuchin monkeys. This suggestion seems consistent with the 427 
idea that reciprocity appears crucial for participants to maintain cooperation in food 428 
sharing situations. Indeed, capuchin monkeys, like chimpanzees, are capable of 429 
contingent reciprocity in an alternating condition (Hattori et al. 2005), though it may be 430 
difficult for them to succeed by spontaneous alternation of donor and recipient roles 431 
(capuchin monkeys: Pelé et al. 2010; chimpanzees: Yamamoto & Tanaka 2009). Future 432 
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studies should ask whether reciprocity facilitates capuchins‟ prosocial food sharing by 433 
exchanging their role in order to test the effect of reciprocity for their prosociality. 434 
One possible explanation for our results in Equal condition is that the recipients 435 
waited to manipulate the apparatus until the operator was standing in front of the 436 
high-value container. This could have led to the outcome we see, in which high-value 437 
rewards are pulled more in the equal labor condition. However, we do not think this 438 
explanation applies in our case, as recipients in fact almost always pulled the handle of 439 
the support board as soon as the screen was removed. That is, recipients did not work 440 
with precise timing. Conceivably, the recipients‟ begging behaviors might be a form of 441 
harassment claiming the operators to share high-value food. Stevens (2004) reported 442 
that begging behaviors (harassment) can play a significant role in food sharing in 443 
chimpanzees and squirrel monkeys. In our previous study (Takimoto et al. 2010), 444 
blocking visual contact between the operator and the recipient resulted in the operators 445 
generally shifting toward giving the low-value food to the recipients, so the latter‟s 446 
begging behaviors may have sustained more prosocial food sharing by operators. If this 447 
applied to the present study, recipients should have shown more begging behaviors in 448 
Equal labor condition than in Unequal labor 1 and 2 conditions; however, the opposite 449 
trend was observed in fact. This result suggests that operator choices of the high-value 450 
food for recipients were not just a reaction to recipients‟ begging signals.  451 
In our previous study (Takimoto et al. 2010), the same operator monkeys chose 452 
the high-value food container for the subordinate recipient more frequently than when 453 
the recipient was absent, even though the recipient received food without any labor. In 454 
the present study, however, they did not choose the high-value container for recipients 455 
more than when they were alone in Unequal labor conditions. This may be because of a 456 
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difference in the operators‟ own labor to obtain food. Previously (Takimoto et al. 2010), 457 
operators had only to pull the handle of the drawer of the container to obtain food, that 458 
is, only one action was required of them. On the other hand, in Unequal labor conditions 459 
of the present study, double actions were required of operators: pulling the handle of the 460 
board and pulling the drawer of the selected container. Therefore, in Unequal labor 461 
conditions, rather, it was expected the operators should have show inequity aversion by 462 
choosing the high-value container significantly less frequently in the presence of the 463 
recipient than in his/her absence if capuchin monkeys are sensitive to others‟ labor. 464 
Contrary to this hypothesis, the operators failed to show such a tendency in Unequal 465 
labor conditions, though they were slightly below chance in giving high-value food in 466 
Unequal labor 2 condition.  467 
However, this result does not necessarily mean lack of inequity aversion in 468 
capuchin monkeys. Capuchins are not only suggested to have inequity aversion in 469 
previous studies (Brosnan & de Waal 2003; Brosnan et al. 2010a; Fletcher 2008; 470 
Takimoto et al. 2010; van Wolkenten et al. 2007) but also shown robust other-regarding 471 
preferences in experimental tasks involving food-sharing (Lakshminarayanan & Santos 472 
2008, Takimoto et al. 2010), token exchange (de Waal et al. 2008) and bar-pulling 473 
(Brosnan et al. 2010a). Therefore, it appears difficult for them to maintain perfect equity 474 
in every interaction because it is also hard to produce prosocial behavior without some 475 
degree of inequity tolerance (Brosnan et al. 2010a). In fact, the evolution of human 476 
society and economic growth are often accompanied by inequality (Aghion et al. 1999), 477 
leaving open the possibility that prosocial motivations must entail inequity tolerance if 478 
they are to result in extensive cooperation.  479 
Recipients continued to cooperate by repositioning the food containers, even 480 
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though this might not necessarily lead to the high-value food for them in the equal labor 481 
condition. This may have been because the operators chose the high-value food 482 
container for both recipients in 65-70% of trials, probably enough to maintain the 483 
recipients‟ motivation to continue cooperating, given the species‟ natural social 484 
tolerance. Capuchin monkeys are reported to donate food to conspecifics (de Waal 485 
1996); such active giving of food has also been observed in our group, involving 486 
unrelated individuals (Hattori, unpublished video recording). Capuchin monkeys are not 487 
cooperative breeders, unlike common marmosets and cottontop tamarins, although they 488 
show allonursing (Baldovino and Di Bitetti 2008, Fragaszy et al. 2004). Moreover, our 489 
capuchins also have lived together for over 8 years. Cronin et al. (2009) reported that 490 
cottontop tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) who were housed together for at least 5 years 491 
continued to cooperate under unequal rewards, but they were sensitive to reward 492 
distributions and cooperated most often when both individuals receive rewards either 493 
simultaneously or over repeated interactions. Brosnan et al. (2005) showed that 494 
chimpanzees with long-term relationships were more tolerant of inequitable reward 495 
distributions.  496 
We also found that recipients showed more begging behaviors for the 497 
high-value food container after operator choices for the low-value container especially 498 
in Equal labor condition compared to Unequal labor 2 condition, but not Unequal labor 499 
1 condition. In other words, the recipient‟s experience of helping the operator on the 500 
task in Equal labor condition reduced their begging behaviors after operator choices for 501 
the low-value container in the unequal labor 2 condition, even though Unequal 1 and 2 502 
conditions were identical. This result suggests that not only operators but also recipients 503 
are sensitive to their own as well as others‟ reward and labor and can adjust their 504 
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behaviors flexibly in a cooperative food sharing situation, that is, recipients may not 505 
expect to receive the high-value food without any labor, and experience frustration by 506 
not receiving the high-value food after their experience of being rewarded in return for 507 
helping others. Indeed, Lakshminarayanan and Santos (2009) reported that capuchins 508 
easily inhibit the tendency to reach directly for food in an object retrieval task, 509 
successfully employing an alternative reaching strategy that allows them to achieve 510 
good retrieval performance. Additionally, we have demonstrated that capuchins are 511 
capable of delaying of gratification by waiting until additional food items had 512 
accumulated before reaching for the food, thereby increasing the total amount obtained 513 
(Anderson et al. 2010), changing their requesting actions flexibly in response to 514 
changes in the experimenter‟s attention (Hattori et al. 2010) and modifying their own 515 
behaviors according to a conspecific‟s emotional expressions (Morimoto and Fujita in 516 
press). All of these relevant studies convergingly support capuchins‟ sensitivity to 517 
others‟ behavior and behavioral flexibility.  518 
In conclusion, this is the first study to have shown that capuchin monkeys, not 519 
only operators but also recipients, are sensitive to others‟ labor and behave flexibly 520 
based on their own experience in a cooperative food sharing situation. More specifically, 521 
operator monkeys actively distributed better food to the recipient if he/she helped them 522 
to access rewards in the joint task. Our study indicates that perceived effort may be 523 
more crucial in joint tasks for capuchin monkeys and shows that joint tasks are 524 
particularly useful to explore the origin of inequity aversion in nonhuman primates. 525 
However, it is still unknown whether capuchins are aware of the amount of others‟ 526 
effort and whether they compare the cost/benefit relationship between self and others. 527 
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Table 1 The test sequence in each experiment. Each cell shows the social rank of the 723 
recipient. This procedure was conducted in a counterbalanced order across the 724 






















session 1~10 11~20 21~30 31~40 41~50 51~60 
labor Unequal 1   Equal   Unequal 2   
operator recipient            
Pigmon Subordinate  Dominant  Subordinate  Dominant  Subordinate  Dominant  
Zilla Dominant  Subordinate  Dominant  Subordinate  Dominant  Subordinate  
Zinnia Dominant  Subordinate  Dominant  Subordinate  Dominant  Subordinate  
Kiki Subordinate Dominant  Subordinate Dominant  Subordinate Dominant  






















Figure 1 The experimental setup in Unequal labor condition (a) and Equal labor 765 
condition (b). In Unequal labor condition (a), the operator had to first pull the handle of 766 
the support board and then pull the drawer of one container. The recipient received food 767 
passively. In Equal labor condition (b), the recipient had to pull the handle of the board 768 
in order to enable the operator to operate the drawer of a container. Then, the operator 769 
pulled the drawer of one container. 770 
 771 
Figure 2 The placement of food for the operator and the recipient in each condition in 772 
all experiments. “H” denotes the high-value food and “L” denotes the low-value food. 773 
 774 
Figure 3 The average number of operator choices for the high-value food container in 775 
Unequal labor 1 condition (a), in Equal labor condition (b) and in Unequal labor 2 776 
condition (c). The x axis shows the experimental condition and the y axis shows the 777 
average number of choices. The left pair of bars in each figure is for Dominant recipient 778 
condition and the right pair of bars is for Subordinate recipient condition. Symbols 779 
denote individuals. Each bar and each symbol is based on 10 trials (= the number of 780 
trials per session). 781 
 782 
Figure 4 The average ratio of recipient begging behaviors for the high-value food 783 
container in Dominant and Subordinate recipient conditions. The x axis shows the 784 
experimental condition and the y axis shows the average ratio of recipient begging 785 
behaviors. The left half of bars is for Dominant recipient condition and the right half of 786 
bars is for Subordinate recipient condition. Symbols denote individuals whom recipients 787 
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begged for the high-value food (operators). Each bar and each symbol is based on 10 788 
trials (= the number of trials per session). 789 
 790 
Figure 5 The average ratio of recipient begging behaviors for the high-value container 791 
after operator choices for the low-value food container in Dominant and Subordinate 792 
recipient conditions. The x axis shows the experimental condition and the y axis shows 793 
the average ratio of recipient begging behaviors. The left half of bars is for Dominant 794 
recipient condition and the right half of bars is for Subordinate recipient condition. 795 
Symbols denote individuals whom recipients begged for the high-value food (operators). 796 
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